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JOINDER UNDER MISSOURI RULE
52.04(a) -PERSONS NEEDED
FOR JUST ADJUDICATION
State ex rel. Emcasco Insurance Co. v. Rush'
Charles Davis was involved in an automobile accident while driving a
car owned by Donald and Shirley Carter. Davis and one passenger were
killed and and two other passengers were injured. The Carter's insurer,
the Emcasco Insurance Company (Emcasco), sought a declaratory judg-
ment concerning its rights and liabilities under the Carter's insurance
policy. Emcasco specifically alleged that the driver Davis was driving
without the Carter's permission and that therefore he was not covered
under the policy's omnibus clause. In the declaratory judgment action,
the two injured passengers, the wife and parents of the deceased pas-
senger, and the estate of the deceased driver were named as defendants.
On motion of one of the injured passengers, the trial court ordered that
the Carters also be joined in the declaratory judgment action. Emcasco
objected to joinder of the Carters and sought a writ of mandamus to
compel the trial court to vacate its order. The St. Louis District of the
Missouri Court of Appeals issued the writ and held that the insured
owners were neither "necessary" nor "indispensable" parties within the
meaning of Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 52.042 and that therefore
their joinder could not be compelled.
1. 546 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
2. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04 provides:
JOINDER OF PERSONS NEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION
(a) PERSONS TO BE JOINED IF FEASIBLE. A person shall
be joined in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the dis-
position of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any
of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incur-
ring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by rea-
son of his claimed interest. If he has not been joined, the court shall
order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant.
(b) DETERMINATION BY COURT WHENEVER JOINDER
NOT FEASIBLE. If a person as described in subdivision (a) (1)-(2)
hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether
in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent party being thus
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the per-
son's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties;
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The principles of compulsory joinder focus on the relationship of a
nonparty with a pending lawsuit. Probably the most influential case in
the development of compulsory joinder rules was Shields v. Barrow.3
The United States Supreme Court recognized two types of parties in the
context of compulsory joinder: "necessary" parties and "indispensable"
parties. It defined necessary parties as those persons whose interest in
litigation ,was sufficiently substantial that joinder should be compelled in
order to do complete justice.4 Indispensable parties were defined as
those persons whose interest in litigation was so substantial that an action
should be dismissed rather than carried on in their absence.5 Sub-
sequent courts have relied heavily on these definitions and have set up
categories of potential parties.6 The courts have found that in certain
situations an absentee's interest was so closely related to a pending action
that he must be joined. Such persons were designated indispensable par-
ties. In other situations the absentee's relation to the lawsuit was such
that the courts said that he should be joined, but if his joinder was not
feasible, it could be excused and the lawsuit proceed in his absence.7
These persons were labeled necessary or conditionally necessary. Such
labels would have retained meaning had the courts used them after a
thorough analysis of the facts to determine an absentee's relation to the
lawsuit.8  Instead, the courts have used the labels as a substitute for
second, the extent to which by protective provisions in the judg-
ment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can
be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will
have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoin-
der....
3. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129 (1854).
4. Id. at 139.
5. Id.
6. Not proper: persons who do not belong in the lawsuit and who may not beparties.Proper: persons who may be a party to a lawsuit but whose joinder is not
compulsory.
Necessary: persons who should be joined but if their joinder is not feasible
then the court can still proceed.
Indispensable: persons who must be joined and if such is not feasible then
the court must dismiss the case.
7. A court might be unable to join an absentee due to lack of service of
process, destruction of subject matter jurisdiction (federal courts only), or objec-
tion to venue (in Missouri improper venue is not a recognized basis to refuse
joinder).
8. See Willard, Compulsory Joinder of Unwilling Plaintiffs in Civil Actions, 25
Mo. L. REv. 63, 66 (1960). Missouri courts seem to use the word "necessary" in
the same sense as the federal courts use the word "indispensable," i.e., meaning
those persons who must be joined before the court will proceed with the action.
See also Bank of California v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 516, 106 P.2d 879
(1940). The court labeled the absentee beneficiaries of a will as "necessary" par-
ties, but then failed to require joinder of those absentee beneficiaries who could
have been joined because others were not subject to the court's jurisdiction.
[Vol. 43
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analysis and have relied upon characterizations of the abstract nature of
the absentee's interest.
Neither adoption of the code joinder rules nor promulgation of the
original Federal Rule of Court Procedure 19 alleviated the courts' re-
liance on labels.9 In practice the rules' wording tended to strengthen
the notions that an absentee "wears a label" 10 and that the conceptual
test of 'joint interest""' I distinguished between permissive joinder and
compulsory joinder. The reliance upon labels became so great that one
decision suggested that the category of "indispensable" parties was a
matter of substantive law and could not be altered by procedural rules.1 2
Although the traditional approach of using labels did not necessarily
lead to undesirable results, it was unsatisfactory in that it did not take
into consideration such factors as probability of future relitigation,
harassment of defendants, protection of the absentee's interest, and the
adequacy of the relief, all of which are relevant to the issue of compul-
sory joinder.'3  In 1966 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 was exten-
sively amended to eliminate the confusion which has surrounded the old
rule 19 by eliminating the categories adopted from Shields v. Barrow.14
Labeling the beneficiaries as "necessary" potentially represented two different
types of parties: persons who have an interest and may be joined but who do not
have to be joined, i.e., a "necessary" party is a proper party whose joinder would
be permissible but not compulsory; and persons who should be made a party
because of their interest, but in the event that joinder is not accomplished, the
court may still proceed in their absence. Use of the label "necessary" to classify
the absentees is in effect meaningless.
9. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 70 (3d ed. 1976). See also Advisory
Committee's Notes to the 1966 Amendment to Rule 19, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 89,
90 (1966), 28 U.S.C. Rule 19, at 7759 (1970).
10. C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 70. But see Fink, Indispensable Parties and the
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE LJ. 403 (1965).
11. The 'joint interest" test was not a workable division between com-
pulsory joinder and permissive joinder. One would hardly expect that,
under such a test, it would uniformly be held that joint tortfeasors
were merely "proper" parties and their joinder was entirely op-
tional, or that joint obligees would be thought to be "indispensable"
while joint obligors were quite possibly only "proper" parties. The
ancient concept of "joint interest" simply made no sense when
applied to questions such as whether a majority of a board of di-
rectors must be parties to a suit to compel declaration of a dividend,
or whether, in an action against a local federal officer, his superior
in Washington must be joined.
C.WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 336 (footnotes omitted).
12. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
365 F.2d 802 (3rd Cir. 1966), vacated sub nom. Provident Tradesmens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
13. See Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REv.
327 (1957).
14. Id. at 483; Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural
Phantom, 61 COL. L. REv. 1254 (1961); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 9.14-.21
19781
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The amended rule 19, which Missouri adopted in Missouri Rule of Civil
Procedure 52.04,15 reflected a new approach to compulsory joinder
without changing the underlying principles. 1 6 Under the new approach
the persons traditionally classified as necessary or indispensable parties
generally will fall into the category of "persons needed for just adjudica-
tion." 17  However, courts now are required to analyze the facts of each
case and to articulate the considerations and factors utilized in deciding
whether a person should be joined.1 8  It is improper for a court to rely
blindly on a characterization of the abstract nature of the absentee's
interest.' 9
As is reflected by the structure of the new rule, analysis of compul-
sory joinder problems is a two step process. The court first must deter-
mine whether the absentee is a person needed for just adjudication.2 0
(2d ed. 1977). See also Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 879-89 (1958).
15. The language of Mo. R. Cav. P. 52.04 is the same as in FED. R. Cav. P. 19
except that references to jurisdiction and venue have been eliminated.
16. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
116 n.12 (1968).
17. The modern approach is more liberal than the old 'joint interest" test
and reflects an affirmative policy of bringing before the court all those interested
persons as are needed for just adjudication.
18. The courts frequently use the term "pragmatic consideration" or "prag-
matic inquiry" as shorthand for the procedure employed in applying rule 52.04.
This is a logical analysis of all relevant facts needed to determine whether an
absentee comes within the meaning of the rule followed by a step by step disclo-
sure of that factual analysis. In Broussard v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.,
398 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1968), the court said:
The new Rule 19 is designed to ameliorate the catechistic distinction
between "necessary" and "indispensable" parties, which had some-
times subordinated logic and reality to historical encrustations.
Under the present rule pragmaticals are to be the solvents of join-
der problems, replacing former rigid terminological descriptions of
parties. We are not to be pinioned by categorical imperatives. In-
stead, the effect on the parties and on the litigation process is to be
the fulcrum of decision.
19. There is no precise formula for determining whether a particular
nonparty must be joined under Rule 19(a). The decision has to be
made in terms of the general policies of avoiding multiple litigation,
providing the parties with complete and effective relief in a single
action and protecting the absent persons from the possible prej-
udicial effect of deciding the case without them. By its very nature
Rule 19(a) calls for determinations that are heavily influenced by the
facts and circumstances of individual cases.
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1604 at
35 (1972) (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, courts are not bound by typical
fact-patterned situations in which judicial responses of joinder are fairly standard
since the rule permits the court to reach decisions as the equities of the factual
situation require. Id. §§ 1612-1624.
20. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04(a), supra note 2.
[Vol. 43
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If the court finds that the absentee is needed for just adjudication then
he must be joined if joinder is feasible. If joinder is not feasiable, then
the second part of the rule comes into play. It provides factors which
must be considered by the court in deciding whether to proceed without
the absentee. 2 1 This note will concern the first section of the rule which
sets out the factors which must be considered by the court in determin-
ing whether an absentee is needed for just adjudication.
In order for the court to determine whether an absentee is a person
needed for just adjudication, it must make a pragmatic inquiry into the
facts and determine whether one of the three tests provided in the new
rule is met.22 If the facts of the case reveal that any one of the tests is
met, then the absentee must be joined if feasible. The first test is
whether complete relief can be granted without joining the absentee.2 3
In order for a court to make this determination, it must consider two
interests. One is the interest of those persons already parties in having
the court provide adequate relief.24 If the court would find itself obli-
gated to grant partial or hollow relief, the absentee meets the criteria for
joinder set out in the rule. 2 5 The other interest concerns judicial
economy. The public has an interest not only in granting adequate relief
but also in avoiding repeated litigation of the same issues. 26
The second test 27 is whether, as a practical matter, the absentee's
interest in the lawsuit will be impaired by a disposition in his absence.2 8
Although the language of the rule says that the absentee must claim an
interest, it has been construed to mean only that the absentee need have
21. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04(b).
22. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 19, § 1604.
23. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04(a)(1).
24. See note 28 infra.
25. See Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1966 Amendment to Rule 19, re-
printed in 39 F.R.D. 89, 91 (1966), 28 U.S.C. Rule 19, at 7759 (1970).
26. See Prestenbackv. Employers' Ins. Co.,47 F.R.D. 163 (D. La. 1969).Seegenerally
Evergreen Park Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc. v. American Equitable
Assurance Co., 417 F.2d 1113 (7th Cir. 1969); Diamond Shamrock Corp. v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 416 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1969); International Union
of Operating Engineers, Local 103 v. Irmscher & Sons, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 394
(N.D. Ind. 1973); Bradley v. School Bd., 51 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Va. 1970); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Beard, 45 F.R.D. 523 (D.S.C. 1968); J.M.L. v. C.L., 536
S.W.2d 944 (Mo. App. D. St. L. 1976).
27. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04(a)(2)(i).
28. Considerations in 52.04(a) overlap with 52.04(b). Rule 52.04(a)(1) is
similar to the third factor in 52.04(b) and rule 52.04(a)(2) is similar to the first
factor in 52.04(b). Despite this significant coincidence, it is important to note that
they have different purposes and therefore different construction. Rule 52.04(a)
reflects an affirmative policy of bringing all interested persons before the court,
whereas the object of rule 52.04(b) is to determine whether it is possible to go
forward with an action despite the nonjoinder of someone whose presence is
desirable but not feasible. See Bennie v. Pastor, 393 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968); 3A
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 19.07-1[0] (2d ed. 1977).
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5
Cupples: Cupples:  Civil Procedure--Compulsory Joinder under Missouri Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
an interest 2 9 and not disclaim it. However, it should be noted that not
every interest is sufficient to compel joinder. An absentee must have
such a direct claim upon the subject of the action that he will either gain
or lose by direct operation of the judgment.3 0 Although courts have not
set up criteria for determining whether an absentee has a "direct claim,"
the courts have discretion to deny compulsory joinder if they find that
there is only a remote or conjectural possibility that the absentee will be
affected by the disposition of the case.
The language of the rule that requires that the absentee's interest be
impaired "as a practical matter" does not mean that a court always may
proceed without considering the potential effect on the absentee simply
because he would not be bound by a judgment in the technical sense.3 1
The focal point of this consideration is either the legal or practical effect
on the absentee's interest3 2 in the event the case is disposed of in his
absence.
The third test 3 is whether those persons already parties in the law-
suit will be prejudiced by a disposition of the case without the absentee.
If adjudication would leave a party in a position where an absentee
could subject him to double or otherwise inconsistent liability, sufficient
prejudice exists to warrant the absentee's joinder. 34
29. See Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1969); Yonofsky v.
Wernick, 362 F. Supp. 1005 (D.N.Y. 1973); Annot., 22 A.L.R. Fed. 765, 795-97
(1975).
30. Bunting v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 522 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. En Banc
1975).
31. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102
(1968).
32. See Hass v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 442 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1971). See also
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 518 F.2d 292 (10th
Cir. 1975) (monetary interest); English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43
(5th Cir. 1972) (employment opportunity interest); Evergreen Park Nursing &
Convalescent Home, Inc. v. American Equitable Assurance Co., 417 F.2d 1113
(7th Cir. 1969) (tort claim which could subject defendants to multiple suits); A. &
M. Gregos, Inc. v. Robertory, 384 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (interest in being
able to perform the contract); International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 103 v. Irmscher & Sons, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 394 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (economic
interest); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92
(C.D. Cal. 1971) (contract rights); Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
293 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (contract rights); O'Shea v. Binswanger, 42
F.R.D. 21 (D. Md. 1967) (economic interest); J.M.L. v. C.L., 536 S.W.2d 944
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976), (reputation interest and interest in being present at a
determination as to the identity of natural parent).
33. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04(a)(2)(ii).
34. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 518 F.2d
292 (10th Cir. 1975); Diamond Shamrock Corp, v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
416 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1969); International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
103 v. Irmscher & Sons, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 394 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Hodgson v.
School Bd., New Kensington-Arnold School District, 56 F.R.D. 393 (W.D. Pa.
1972); Occidental 'Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92
[Vol. 43
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In Emcasco the court correctly explained the background and
mechanics of the approach called for in the new rule.35 However, in
applying the rule the court reverted to the traditional approach and
used conclusory statements rather than making the required pragmatic
considerations. 36  For example, the court said that complete declaratory
relief could be afforded without joinder of the Carters. 37  The court's
reasoning was that because Emcasco did not deny that the Carters were
covered by the policy; the only issue was whether the driver Davis was
covered, and this determination could be made without joining the Car-
ters.
The court failed to refer to particular facts and failed to consider
whether the relief granted would be partial or hollow. The court first
should have considered the practical consequences of this decree should
the Carters elect to relitigate the issue of permission. In addition, the
interest furthered by the rule's first test 38 is not limited to the parties'
interest in having complete relief but also includes the public's interest in
avoiding repeated litigation on the same issue. A finding that Davis had
permission would not bind the Carters; therefore, they could relitigate
the issue. Apparently, this factor was not considered.
In considering the second and third tests,39 the Emcasco court found
that joinder was not required because the Carters did not have a suffi-
cient interest relating to the subject of the action.40 The court did not
discuss what interest, if any, was present, nor did it discuss why that
interest was not a "sufficient interest." The court justified its conclusion
that the Carters were not "necessary" by relying on cases decided under
the traditional approach to compulsory joinder.41 These earlier cases
held that when an insurer has not denied coverage of its insured, the
insured was neither a "necessary" nor an "indispensable" party to a de-
(C.D. Cal. 1971); Window Glass Cutters League v. American St. Gobain Corp.,
47 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 293
F. Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); O-F_.L v. MR.R_, 518 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1974).
35. 546 S.W. at 195-96.
36. See note 18 supra.
37. 546 S.W.2d at 196.
38. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04(a)(1), supra note 2.
39. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04(a)(2)(i), 52.04(a)(2)(ii), supra note 2.
40. 546 S.W.2d at 196-97.
41. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 357 F.2d 315
(10th Cir. 1966); Northwest Cas. Co. v. Kirkman, 119 F. Supp 828 (M.D.N.C.
1954); Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Fredericksen, 8 F.R.D. 55 (D. Neb. 1947); Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 44 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1942). Decisions which used
labels are no longer controlling. If one were to analyze those cases using the
modern approach, he probably would find that the facts are inadequate to make
the required pragmatic considerations. Policy factors concerning compulsory
joinder are more liberal today and reflect an affirmative policy of bringing all
interested persons before the court.
1978] 579
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claratory judgment proceeding.42 The court's reliance on cases decided
under the traditional approach is typical of the analysis employed by
Missouri courts before the adoption of the new rule.43  The Emcasco
court was simply trying to categorize the Carters' interest; this is not
proper under the modern approach.
Provident Tradesmens Bank and Trust Co. v. Patterson 44 is a leading
case discussing the operation of the new rule. While it is known primar-
ily for its discussion of whether a court should proceed whenever joinder
is not feasible, the district court's analysis of the interests of the parties41
is representative of the approach required by the first part of the
rule.4 6 The factual similarity to Emcasco makes the issues raised and
analyzed representative of the types of factors that should have been
considered in Emcasco. In Provident a collision between a truck and a
borrowed car caused serious injuries and several deaths. The estate of
one of the passengers sued the estate of the driver, Donald Cionci, in
federal court. The estate of the truck driver and a surviving passenger
brought actions in state court against Cionci and Edward Dutcher, the
owner of the car. These two actions in state court were still pending
when the federal action against Cionci's estate was settled for $50,000.
Cionci's estate was insolvent. The passenger's estate then sought a de-
claratory judgment to determine whether the driver Cionci was covered
by Dutcher's insurance policy, which had a $100,000 upper limit. The
only defendants in the declaratory action were the insurance company
and Cionci's estate. Dutcher was not made a party; his joinder would
have defeated diversity. The district court found that the measure of
Dutcher's protection under his insurance policy was dependent upon the
outcome of the declaratory judgment action.4 7 The court pointed out
that Dutcher had an interest in the question whether he would be pro-
tected by his insurance policy up to the $100,000 maximum or whether
he would have to share the policy's coverage with Cionci's estate. If
42. See cases cited in note 41, supra.
43. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04 was amended April 21, 1972, and became effective
December 1, 1972. Missouri cases prior to this date and federal cases prior to
July 1, 1966, the amended date of FED. R. Civ. P. 19, follow the traditional
approach.
44. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
45. 218 F. Supp. at 805-06.
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) is the same as Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04(a). See note 2
supra.
47. Although Provident is noted for its discussion of Rule 19(b), it has signifi-
cance in the construction of Rule 19(a). When the Supreme Court said, "[wle
may assume, at the outset, that Dutcher falls within the category of persons who,
under ... [Rule 19) (a), should be 'joined if feasible,'" one can infer that the
Court recognized and approved the district court's analysis of Dutcher's interest.
390 U.S. at 108.
[Vol. 43
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Dutcher had to share his limited liability coverage with Cionci's estate,
the policy would be worth less to him than if he had it all to himself.
The court's analysis of Dutcher's interest exemplifies the modern
approach contemplated by rule 52.04 to determine whether an absentee
"has an interest." If the court finds that the absentee by reason of his
interest is a person needed for just adjudication, the absentee must be
joined if his joinder is feasible. If joinder is not feasible, the court must
then use the factors set out in rule 52.04(b) to determine whether in
equity and good conscience the action should proceed in his absence.
The factual similarity between Provident and Emcasco makes the is-
sues raised and analyzed in Provident representative of the issues that
should have been considered in Emcasco. Before the Emcasco court could
determine the Carters' interest in the lawsuit, it should have considered
such issues as: whether the insurance policy had a maximum liability
coverage for a single accident; the maximum liability coverage; the total
amount of potential claims arising out of the accident; whether, as a
practical matter as opposed to a mere remote possibility, the Carters
could be liable under some principle of vicarious liability; and whether
the Carters openly disclaimed their "interest." Without knowledge of
such or similar facts, the court cannot properly justify a conclusion
whether or not the Carters had an "interest" in the lawsuit. When the
court said that the "Carters ... have no sufficient 'interest relating to the
subject of the action,' "48 it could not be applying the modern approach
required by the new rule. 49
Although the court correctly laid out the mechanics of the new rule,
it reverted in application to the tradtional approach of compulsory join-
der by using conclusory statements and labels. The modern approach
requires the court to disclose facts that demonstrate the existence or
nonexistence of the three tests provided in rule 52.04(a) before deter-
mining whether the absentee is a person needed for just adjudication.
Had the Emcasco court attempted to analyze the facts presented, it would
have discovered that the facts were inadequate to make a pragmatic
analysis and therefore insufficient to support a finding whether the
Carters were "necessary" parties.50  The court of appeals should have
remanded Emcasco for further inquiry into the relevant facts.51
STEPHEN CUPPLES
48. 546 S.W.2d at 196-97.
49. Accord, Le Beau v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 484 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1973);
Wright v. First Nat'l Bank, 483 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1973); Kingsley v. Burack, 536
S.W.2d 7 (Mo. En Banc 1976); Shaffer v. Dalrymple, 507 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1974).
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